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In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, commentators focused on the political polarization separating residents of urban and rural America. 
Certainly rural–urban differences are only one of 
several factors that contributed to the surprising 2016 
outcome, but rural voters are rightly acknowledged 
as one key factor in Donald Trump’s electoral success. 
the Democrats’ urban vote share in 2008 and 2012, and 
Clinton maintained it in 2016. Next on the continuum 
from Democratic to Republican counties are the 
suburbs of these large metropolitan areas where both 
Obama in 2012 and Clinton earned slightly less than a 
majority (49.6 and 47.8 percent), respectively.
The voting patterns in smaller urban areas are similar to 
those in the larger metropolitan areas (Figure 2). In 2012, 
Obama received nearly half of the vote in the urban cores 
of smaller metropolitan areas. Clinton received slightly 
less. As with the larger metropolitan areas, the suburbs of 
smaller urban areas are more strongly Republican. It is at 
this point along the rural–urban continuum that the con-
trast between earlier elections and 2016 is evident. Here 
the gap between Democratic support in 2012 and 2016 
widened—to Clinton’s detriment. Many of these small 
suburban counties contain the sparsely settled urban 
periphery that is more rural than urban.
Defining 2016 as the tale of two Americas—one 
urban, one rural—hinders a nuanced under-
standing of the country’s political geography.
Yet, defining 2016 as the tale of two Americas—one 
urban, one rural—hinders a nuanced understanding of 
the country’s political geography. Many political com-
mentators mistakenly caricature rural America as a 
single entity, but our research summarized here shows 
that complex variations in voting patterns persist 
among both urban and rural places.1 Rural America 
is a remarkably diverse collection of places including 
more than 70 percent of the land area of the United 
States and 46 million people.2 Both demographic and 
voting trends in this vast area are far from monolithic. 
Here we examine voting patterns over the last five 
presidential elections, treating rural–urban differences 
as a continuum, not a dichotomy. 
Presidential Voting Along the Rural–
Urban Continuum
At one end of the continuum are urban core coun-
ties of large metropolitan areas, where Democrats 
received their greatest support in the last five presi-
dential elections. Al Gore and John Kerry averaged 
slightly less than 60 percent of the vote in these areas 
in 2000 and 2004 (Figure 1). Barack Obama boosted 
At the rural end of the con-
tinuum, counties tend to be more 
Republican, but there is variation 
within these rural areas. Democrats 
consistently did worse in counties 
remote from urban areas, and in 
those without large towns of 10,000 
to 50,000. This pattern persisted 
in 2016, but there was a substan-
tial decline in support for Clinton 
across all types of rural coun-
ties. For example, in 2012 Obama 
received 41.6 percent of the vote in 
rural counties adjacent to metro-
politan areas that contained a large 
town and 38.9 percent in those 
that did not. In contrast, Clinton 
received just 33.1 percent in these 
adjacent large town counties and 
29.7 percent in other adjacent 
counties. The pattern is similar in 
remote rural counties that are not 
adjacent to urban areas. In 2012, 
Obama received 40.4 percent in 
non-adjacent large town counties 
and 35.8 percent in those without a 
town. In contrast, Clinton received 
just 33.1 percent in the large-town 
remote counties and 27.1 percent 
of the vote in remote counties 
without a town.
In sum, through the last five 
presidential elections, voting pat-
terns were consistent along our 
rural–urban continuum. Democrats 
did best at the urban end of the con-
tinuum and Republicans at the rural 
end. What is distinctly different in 
2016 is that Hillary Clinton did far 
worse across the entire rural end of 
the continuum than any Democratic 
candidate in the previous four presi-
dential elections. In total, Clinton 
received 2.1 million fewer votes in 
rural America than Obama did four 
years earlier, even though 531,000 
Source: Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, Dave Leip, 1/31/2017
FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ALONG THE RURAL–URBAN CONTINUUM, 
2000 TO 2016
What is distinctly different in 
2016 is that Hillary Clinton 
did far worse across the entire 
rural end of the continuum 
than any Democratic can-
didate in the previous four 
presidential elections. 
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Source: Authors’ Analysis of USDA ERS Typologies
more votes were cast there in 2016. 
She also received 338,000 fewer 
votes in the suburban counties of 
small metro areas on the rural–
urban edge, even though 450,000 
more votes were cast.
Conclusion
The residents of large urban 
core counties are the base of the 
Democratic Party: they are the most 
likely to identify as Democrat, vote 
Democrat, and hold liberal attitudes 
on a host of social and political 
issues.3 Democrats also enjoy consid-
erable support in the suburbs of these 
large urban areas, as well as in the 
cores of smaller metropolitan areas, 
though they received less than 50 
percent of the vote in each. Outside 
of these areas, Democrats faced a 
slippery slope. On the outer edges of 
smaller urban areas and in the vast 
rural regions beyond, Republicans 
find much friendlier territory.
Clinton nearly matched Obama’s 
performance in the three most 
populous areas of our continuum, 
where she received 55.9 million 
of the 106.7 million votes cast. 
But her campaign faced defeat by 
a thousand cuts along the rest of 
the urban-rural continuum, where 
she received just 8.8 million of 28 
million votes cast. Certainly, these 
rural vote totals are dwarfed by 
those in urban areas. But, from 
the suburban periphery of smaller 
urban areas to the most far-flung 
rural areas, Clinton’s inability to 
match the performance of any 
Democratic candidate since at least 
2000 contributed to her defeat 
in crucial swing states such as 
Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Though many commentators 
argued that the faster population 
growth and growing diversity on 
the urban side of the rural–urban 
continuum would give Democrats 
a significant advantage in 2016, the 
election demonstrated that what 
happens at the rural end of the con-
tinuum remains important.
FIGURE 2: THE RURAL–URBAN CONTINUUM
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Methods
To characterize the rural–urban continuum, we subdi-
vided counties into eight categories from the densely 
settled cores of large urban areas to the most remote 
rural counties.4 The sixty-seven large core metropoli-
tan counties include the major city and inner sub-
urbs of urban areas containing more than 1 million 
people. More than 98.5 million people reside there. An 
additional 79.3 million people reside in the 365 large 
suburbs counties that adjoin these large core counties. 
The 339 urban core counties of metropolitan areas of 
less than 1 million were classified as small core. They 
contain 78.9 million residents. An additional 392 small 
suburbs counties with 18.6 million residents surround 
these small metro cores. 
We subdivided the 1,949 rural counties outside these 
metropolitan areas into four groups based on both their 
proximity to urban areas and whether they have a large 
town (10,000–50,000). Contiguous to metro areas were 
372 adjacent town counties with 18.4 million residents, 
and 654 counties with 12 million residents that had no 
large town: adjacent others. Among the more remote 
rural counties, 269 were nonadjacent town counties 
with 8.9 million residents and the remaining 679 coun-
ties were nonadjacent other with 6.9 million residents.
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